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Displaced populations and urban poor no longer left behind



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**DISPLACED
POPULATIONS
— AND —
URBAN POOR
NO LONGER
LEFT BEHIND**

**An options paper by the
Special Advisor on Internal
Displacement, Prof. Walter
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Durable Solutions Unit in the
Office of the DSRSG/RC/HC**

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INTRODUCTION¹

The Somalia Durable Solutions Initiative (DSI), launched in early 2016 by the then Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia (DSRSG/RC/HC) Peter de Clercq and led by the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) is,

“A collective framework aligned to the National Development Plan and aims to design, fund and implement durable solutions in a coherent and coordinated way. It is also meant to collectively guide approaches and programming on durable solutions, and to support the capacity of government at federal, state and local levels to provide durable solutions for the internally displaced, returning refugees and their host communities.”²

Based on the Nairobi Declaration and Action Plan on Somali refugees, the DSI is also recognized as the main framework for the promotion of long term reintegration of refugee returnees (hereinafter: returnees) in Somalia and the implementation of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF).³

While the DSI approaches its three-year mark since its launch, and after seven missions by the Special Advisor on Internal Displacement, a review of the DSI, its achievements and bottlenecks is warranted as the UN leadership is undergoing a transition. The following sections would like to propose a vision and a set of options to achieve a situation whereby Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees are no longer left behind, they are empowered to rebuild their lives (both socially and economically) and are able to join mainstream society.

1 This paper serves as the 7th mission report by the Special Advisor. During his mission from 11 – 14 March 2019 he met with the Minister of Interior H. E. Abdi Mohamed Sabriye; the Mayor of Mogadishu, the head of the BRA Durable Solutions Unit as well as representatives of the Prime Minister's Office. He also participated in a UNCT-HTC meeting on the New Way of Working. Part of the mission was carried out conjointly with UN-Habitat InterRegional Advisor on Displacement and Urbanization, Dyfed Aubrey.
2 <https://www.uninsomalia.org/durable-solutions-initiative>. Last assessed on 7 May 2019
3 Nairobi Declaration on Durable Solutions for Somali Refugees and Reintegration of Returnees in Somalia of 25th March 2017, section III, para 6 and Annex to the Declaration, Nairobi Comprehensive Plan of Action for Durable Solutions for Somali Refugees; paras. 2.1.5 and 2.1.10.

THE PRESENT DISPLACEMENT SITUATION

The present displacement situation in Somalia can be characterized as follows:

- **It is large-scale:**

Somalia has an estimated 2.4 million IDPs⁴, out of which around 1.5 million persons arrived since the 2016/17 drought and as a consequence of the more recent fighting in Al-Shabab controlled areas.⁵ While between December 2014 and the end of 2018 a total of 123,300 refugees have returned to Somalia, on 1 January 2019 over 880,000 Somalis were still living outside their country as registered refugees or asylum-seekers, mainly in the Horn of Africa and Yemen region.⁶ On a per capita basis, Somalia has one of the highest caseloads with more than one out of five Somalis⁷ displaced within or outside the country. Reasons for displacement are conflict as well as disasters (drought and, to a lesser extent, flooding) with the two causes often interacting. Reasons for protracted displacement include: ongoing conflict and insecurity, making returns to rural areas difficult; fragile governance and lack of economic diversification in urban areas which results in weak absorption capacities; and mechanisms of social exclusions.

- **It is mainly urban:**

According to OCHA, around 2.2 million out of the total 2.4 million IDPs live in settlements in urban and periurban areas⁸ where they are often joined by Somali refugees returning from neighboring countries (returnees) who cannot go back to their original place of residence. Most IDPs opt for permanent local integration or do not plan to return for the time being. Permanent and sustainable returns of IDPs and returnees to areas of origin have been rare and there are no indications that this will change in the foreseeable future. Thus, internal displacement and refugee returns contribute to the fast urbanization trend in Somalia where already now more than 40% of the population live in cities and where it is estimated that as soon as 2026 one out of two Somalis will live in an urban area.⁹

- **It is, or risks to be, protracted for most IDPs and returnees:**

According to OCHA, at least 45 per cent of IDPs have been displaced for longer than five years and 42 per cent for one to three years.¹⁰ Prospects for large-scale returns to places of origin remain dim. The particularly high levels of continuing food insecurity among IDPs,¹¹ the large numbers of evictions, particularly in Mogadishu,¹² and the fact that 2 million out of the 3.4 million Somalis targeted by the 2019 Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) are IDPs¹³ indicate that most IDPs have not been able to improve their situation and continue to depend on humanitarian assistance. Thus, most IDPs live or, if recently arrived, risk living in protracted internal displacement, understood as a situation where IDPs are prevented from taking or are unable to take steps for significant periods of time to progressively reduce their vulnerability, impoverishment and marginalization and find a durable solution.¹⁴

- **It is, simultaneously, a humanitarian, development and a peacebuilding challenge:**

As increasingly recognized by the FGS and the international community (see below, sections 3.1 and 4), Somalia's large-scale protracted internal displacement situation is not only a humanitarian challenge requiring longterm humanitarian interventions. It also undermines Somalia's development efforts by keeping large numbers of people in absolute poverty,¹⁵ burdening host communities in poor parts of cities, and creating obstacles to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Protracted internal displacement also creates challenges for peacebuilding where, due to tensions between IDPs and host communities, social cohesion is undermined or where the lack of prospects for a better life among the youth creates a fertile ground for radicalization.

4 Federal Government of Somalia, National Development Plan 2020-2024, forthcoming, p.16.

5 OCHA, Somalia Humanitarian Response Plan 2019, p. 7. If the drought conditions in many parts of the country continue to worsen, the number of IDPs may further increase in the course of this year. Presently, an emergency food insecurity phase is predicted for much of Somaliland and Puntland: FSNAU, Quarterly Brief - Focus on Gu 2019 Season Early Warning, 29 April 2019.

6 UNHCR, <http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/UNHCR%20Somalia%20Operational%20Update%20-%20January%202019.pdf>.

7 According to World Bank estimates, the population of Somalia amounted to more than 14.7 mio persons (<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL>; accessed 7 May 2019). Following DRC, Somalia was in 2017 the second most affected country by new displacement (<http://www.internal-displacement.org/global-report/grid2018/downloads/2018-GRID.pdf>, last accessed on 7 May 2019).

8 OCHA, Somalia Humanitarian Response Plan 2019, p. 7.

9 UNHabitat, Towards Sustainable Urban Development and IDP Durable Solutions at Scale, Findings of the mission of the Inter-Regional Advisor on Urbanization and Displacement (forthcoming).

10 OCHA, Somalia Humanitarian Response Plan 2019, p. 7.

11 See, e.g. FSNAU, Somalia Acute Food Security Situation Overview - Rural, Urban and IDP Populations: February - June 2019, Most Likely Scenario, <http://www.fsnau.org/ipc/ipc-map>.

12 IDMC, City of flight: New and secondary displacements in Mogadishu, Somalia, November 2018.

13 OCHA, Somalia Humanitarian Response Plan 2019, p. 5.

14 Walter Kälin and Hannah Entwistle Chapuisat, Breaking the Impasse - Reducing Protracted Internal Displacement as a Collective Outcome, OCHA 2016, p. 20.

15 The World Bank, Somalia Poverty Profile June 2017, p. ix found that „Poverty incidence is highest in IDP settlements where seven out of ten people are poor.“ See also p. 5.

DURABLE SOLUTIONS:

WHAT HAS (NOT) BEEN ACHIEVED SO FAR

3.1 Achievements

Notable achievements with regard to durable solutions include:

● Regarding policy dialogue and development:

- o Integration and mainstreaming of internal displacement into relevant chapters of the National Development Plan (NDP) 2017-2019.¹⁶
- o Integration of durable solutions aspects into the Recovery and Resilience Framework (RRF) where “[promoting] durable solutions for displacement affected communities” features among the RRF’s five strategic objectives.
- o Adoption of a collective outcome by the UNCT/HCT in line with the New Way of Working, formulated as “Risk and vulnerability reduced and resilience of internally displaced persons, refugee returnees and host communities strengthened in order to reach durable solutions for 100,000 displaced households by 2022.”¹⁷
- o Ongoing advocacy for the enhancement of the humanitarian-development-peacebuilding nexus or the “New Way of Working” across all actors, and enhanced support through increase of predictable multi-year financing, development financing, debt clearance and access to concessional financing.

● Regarding planning and programming:

- o Ongoing efforts (local and central) to identify area based collective outcomes to find durable solutions for some IDPs and returnees. Three locations are currently being looked at by government and partners in Mogadishu, Baidoa and Bossaso, with prospects to expand in other regions.
- o Collective advocacy efforts on durable solutions that have mobilized close to US\$ 87 million since the launch of the initiative.¹⁸
- o New joined-up UN and NGOs programming on durable solutions which enhance learning and good practice, in particular the Midnimo programme, a joined-up programme funded by the UN Peace Building Fund (PBF); the EU-funded RE-INTEG programmes; and most recently Danwadaag (DfID funded, led by IOM, Concern and ReDDDS). Joint coordination and implementation through the establishment of joint steering committees for these programmes composed by implementing actors including the local, state and federal

government authorities.

- o Introduction of a durable solutions and resilience marker for humanitarian projects in the 2019 HRP (OCHA 2019: 14) and of a solutions marker for the Aid Flow Mapping tool that tracks contributions made towards the strategic objectives of the NDP and has enabled government and partners to identify the investment on durable solutions.
- o Ongoing synchronization of durable solutions programming with broader peace and state building programming and resilience agenda to increase coherence, synergies and resources allocation.

● Regarding coordination:

- o Establishment of a collective platform for coordination on durable solutions with the Government of Somalia and the international community – the Resilience Pillar Working Group and Sub-Working Group on Migration, Displacement and Durable Solutions (MDDS) under the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility (SDRF), ensuring the alignment of funds and programmes with the NDP. The group endorsed in February 2019 common principles of engagement for Durable Solutions Joint Programming
- o Establishment of a Durable Solutions Secretariat consisting of 14 government institutions coordinated by the Ministry of Planning, Investments and Economic Development (MOPEID) with currently ongoing work on regional state level coordination.
- o Establishment of durable solutions units in key municipalities in South West State and Banadir. It is also worth mentioning current government led efforts for relocations in Baidoa, spearheaded by the South West Minister of Disaster Management and Humanitarian Affairs as well as the Mayor of Baidoa.
- o Establishment of a Durable Solutions Working Group composed by UN agencies and NGOs to improve complementarity, efficiency and collective accountability of interventions, as part of the work conducted by the UN Programme Management Team and Inter-Cluster Coordination Group.

¹⁶ Federal Government of Somalia, National Development Plan 2017-2019, pp. 38, 151 with cross-references to other chapters.

¹⁷ OCHA, Somalia Humanitarian Response Plan 2019, p. 61.

¹⁸ Source MOPIED, Aid Mapping Exercise Dataset – Durable Solutions marker.

3.2 Lessons learnt

Despite these efforts and achievements, it is difficult to assess the degree to which the overall situation of IDPs has improved. There are no common tools to appraise how many households in a situation of forced displacement were able to voluntarily transition to a durable solution of their choice – whether this be through local integration, return and/or settlement in another location (hereinafter: resettlement). This can be explained by a variety of reasons, including the fact that most first-generation projects are still being implemented, and due to the complexities of the implementation context.

Looking back, several lessons can be drawn from the normative, institutional and operational experience since 2016.

At the normative level, the DSI would have enormously benefitted from an implementation strategy for the achievement of the NDP Strategic Objectives. This would have helped to outline more effectively principles of engagement, priority target locations, a monitoring framework for the achievement of solutions and for mutual accountability. Although the Solutions Analyses for Mogadishu, Kismayo and Baidoa¹⁹ provide an outlook of the durable solutions needs in those locations, they need to be complemented by a clear notion of how to measure local integration in an effort to create a broad-based consensus on strategies for the long-term sustainability of the DSI, and the interventions in its support.

Institutionally, one of the main recommendations for the success of a DSI has been to create an inter-ministerial body for the coordination of durable solutions. In this regard, much greater attention should have been paid to support the Government early on with technical advisory and guidance to ensure a whole-of-government approach to durable solutions in a context where several governmental entities and line ministries have (sometimes overlapping) responsibilities with regard to resolving displacement issues and the working relationship between agencies specialized on displacement and refugees and other governmental entities has been difficult. Horizontal as well as vertical coordination and cooperation implies a strong sense of roles and responsibilities to guide policy and government action. Achieving clarity and a sense of institutional roles for young institutions and administrations to guide and steer complex processes of social integration requires time. Capacity issues in this regard have been flagged multiple times by the authorities and they were met with support on salaries, personnel, and equipment. However, these efforts were not always well coordinated within the international community and often undertaken without a clear vision and strategic outlook that would have helped the government moving ahead with creating a sustainable institutional framework to face the challenge of finding durable solutions for so many IDPs and returnees.

At the same time, the international community has not always been able to create effective frameworks of accountability for the investment of its resources. A shift towards longer term and sustainable investment is slowly emerging now but government

and partners have learned that it takes time to change practices and instruments for the financing of durable solutions. Deliberate effort to move towards joined-up implementation modalities for the durable solutions projects mentioned above (3.1) are encouraging. However, despite the efforts, an analysis of the Aid Flows in Somalia shows that most of the interventions in the resilience and durable solutions sector remain fragmented and channeled through a multiplicity of contributions with a modality of investment that frequently engages one donor and one or a few implementing partners. These interventions are typically short term. Consortia and joint programmes funded through multilateral basket funds have nonetheless attempted to create coherence based on joint implementation and different frameworks of accountability. While consortia create accountability between donors and implementing partners, joint programmes include the government in the management and accountability of operations. Only three projects related to durable solutions since 2016 were implemented through multi-partner trust funds. Actors involved in Aid Coordination and Effectiveness should familiarize humanitarian donors and partners with the functioning, benefits and processes related to the investment on multi-partner trust funds.

Furthermore, at the operational level, a system of localized multi-stakeholder coordination platforms would have been beneficial for the implementation and monitoring of the projects and probably enhanced their effectiveness. These types of platforms would contribute to strengthening the legitimacy of existing or new institutions (i.e. district councils) at the local level. These institutional processes have proven to be lengthy, delicate and non-linear, as demonstrated by the fact that since 2015 only two councils were elected in the new Federal Member States. This is impacting the strategy of projects like Midnimo which were conceived to support the accountability between displaced persons and local governments, in preparation of district council elections. Partners along the peace-humanitarian-development spectrum should devise options to manage the complications and delays related to the creation of formal institutions at the local level. It is crucial that partners avoid the creation of parallel and competing structures that would undermine institution building at the local level as well as the formation of local district councils.

Durable solutions operations have frequently been delayed because of land tenure security issues related to sites allocated for relocation or housing, or because of issues related to securing permits for the rehabilitation of public buildings. Durable solutions interventions would have benefitted from a strong “spatial strategy”, including advocacy for land and tenure security with authorities at all levels already at the stage of grant development or project design.

Last but not least, the DSI to date has not yet promoted networks of local advocates to create at sub-national levels a broad base to sustain the DSI and a demand for institutional engagement and policy making that is locally generated. Networks of

19 Available at <https://regionaldss.org/index.php/research-and-knowledge-management/redss-solution-analyses/somalia-solutions-analyses/> (accessed 7 May 2019).

women, youth, religious leaders, academics, business actors and others among displaced as well as host communities are not yet involved as they should be in the discussions on local integration, return or resettlement. While mobilizing groups to achieve a “whole of society approach”, Durable Solutions partners should refrain from engaging exclusively with groups that are strong enough to create structured organizations, and rather promote the creation of spaces that will eventually contribute to the formation of networks of actors supporting durable solutions.

3.3 Remaining challenges

Since 2016, much progress has been achieved. Nevertheless, there is a risk that the present efforts will not be sufficient to bring interventions to the scale that is necessary to bring substantial changes for a considerable number of IDPs in protracted displacement. To make real progress in the coming years to attain durable solutions, a series of key challenges must be addressed.

To create an environment conducive for achieving durable solutions three elements are necessary:

- A strong humanitarian-development-peacebuilding nexus: Despite progress made at conceptual and in some instances also operational levels, taking the humanitarian-development-peacebuilding nexus seriously by being not only aware of the different discourses and the concepts underlying them but also drawing practical conclusions from such understanding in order to implement a more holistic approach to durable solutions for IDPs and returnees is a necessity to make real progress. This is a particular challenge for the international community with its traditional insistence on clear distinctions between these three areas in institutional, funding and operational terms (below, section 4).

- A sound normative framework: At the time of this writing, the Somalia National Policy for Refugees, Returnees and IDPs (hereinafter National Returnee and IDP Policy) was being finalized. The April 2019 draft version of the Policy reflects international standards well. Remaining problems concern institutional issues (below, section 6.4). The Draft Housing, Land and Property Act for Refugees, Returnees & IDPs as well as the National Evictions Guidelines were also in the process of finalization. They are important as in general the current legal instruments do not clarify how individuals or groups in displacement can enjoy access to rights and services. In particular, legal frameworks that would provide local authorities with the power to stop forced evictions and ensure that evictions are carried out in accordance with relevant national and international standards are of key importance.²⁰ It would be important to have these instruments adopted as a matter of priority.

The NDP was also being prepared but no draft was available. It remains to be seen to what extent the NDP (i) will mainstream displacement issues; (ii) focus on an urbanization and poverty alleviation perspective to achieve durable solutions; (iii) link responsibilities for durable solutions to resource allocation and an accountability framework based on fiscal scenarios; (iv) and promote interventions which trigger private investments and facilitate public-private partnerships (see below 4.1 and 5.2).

- Project approaches able to bring interventions to scale: At the operational level much progress has been made. At the same time, available resources are too low and present approaches too limited to allow for effectively scaling efforts up to a level that would have a real impact and allow considerable numbers of IDPs and their hosts to move ahead towards sustainable solutions. This is exacerbated by the lack of incentives for local actors and stakeholders to provide such solutions and the absence of private actors as key partners for success. Thus, the challenge is to find ways that allow reaching a much higher level of interventions. While it is clear that finding durable solutions for the more than 2 million IDPs in Somalia will take time, there are possibilities to considerably scale up projects based on public-private partnerships (below, section 5).

- Institutional arrangements facilitating a whole-of-government approach: At the institutional level, the Cabinet Committee on Social and Human Development chaired by the Prime Minister and the Durable Solutions Secretariat provide a good institutional framework for ensuring a whole-of-government approach to durable solutions. While efforts are underway to clarify roles and responsibilities of key actors, several institutional issues remain unresolved. The key challenge remains to strengthen and sustain a whole of government approach (below, section 6). This can be achieved through (1) further strengthening the recently established Durable Solutions Secretariat to ensure whole of government approach to work towards collective outcomes; (2) an effective coordination mechanism at the federal level where important progress in clarifying the roles of Federal Ministries has been made through the setting up of the Cabinet Committee on Social Development chaired by the Prime Minister and the elaboration of a Social Development Roadmap which has the “Provision of durable solution for IDPs” as one of its five goals²¹, as well as through the instatement of a Durable Solutions Secretariat; and (3) more clarity regarding the respective roles of the federal and the state and local levels as all levels. While it is clear that municipalities are the frontline actors at the operational level, institutions at federal and state levels need to create the normative and financial instruments to sustain operations and policy implementation over time.

20 Both Federal Government (Office of the Prime Minister and NCRI) as well as regional administration (BRA) have worked on Eviction Guidelines. These are broadly aligned with international standards but they have not been formally adopted. Cf. Federal Republic of Somalia, Draft National Evictions Guidelines, 2019 (forthcoming); Banadir Regional Administration, Eviction Guidelines, 2019 (forthcoming).

21 Federal Republic of Somalia, Office of the Prime Minister, Road Map for Social Development Sector, 2017-2020, p. 2.

THE CONCEPTUAL CHALLENGE:

TAKING THE HUMANITARIAN-DEVELOPMENT-PEACEBUILDING NEXUS SERIOUSLY

At the global level, it is increasingly recognized that humanitarian, development, peace, and security and political actors each have an essential role to play in addressing and reducing protracted internal displacement. This is one of the key messages of the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit²² and has since been reiterated by, for instance, the Wilton Park Principles on New Approaches to Protracted Forced Displacement²³ or, at the regional level, the EU Council²⁴ and the recent OECD/DAC Recommendation on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus.²⁵ However, this recognition is not always being translated into action.

An important starting point for the international community to address these challenges and overcome obstacles is to go beyond rhetorical commitments and take the humanitarian-development-peacebuilding nexus seriously by being not only aware of the different discourses and the concepts underlying them but also drawing practical conclusions from such understanding in order to implement a more holistic approach to durable solutions for IDPs and returnees in Somalia.

4.1. Humanitarian and development actors: Common values – compatible concepts

In Somalia, reconciling perspectives and interventions carried out by humanitarian and development partners should primarily acknowledge that practitioners across the spectrum more often than not operate in the same space, and are likely to look at similar populations,²⁶ dealing in some cases with the same institutional counterparts. Humanitarian and development actors coexist in a context that is dynamic and volatile, where processes of state building, reconciliation, stabilization are entwined and affect in multiple ways the spaces, populations and institutions with which they interface.

As the report “Breaking the Impasse” points out, “humanitarian and development actors need to become more familiar with each other’s concept notions and terminologies, [...] in order to transcend [...] artificial institutional divides and develop and implement collective outcomes on protracted internal displacement”.²⁷ Deconstructing these divides warrants a revision of processes to achieve those collective outcomes as a convergence of values and principles that creates a common understanding can go a long way in maximizing the impact of interventions that until

now remained disjointed in cases where different interventions target the same groups and the same areas. This is facilitated by the compatibility (rather than opposition) of concepts and values:

- The centrality of human dignity is a common denominator to the humanitarian imperative of saving life, and to the principle of equity guiding development action and underlying the Agenda 2030 with its message of “no one left behind”. In Somalia the adoption of the Centrality of Protection Strategy in 2018 offers a basis for these considerations. The Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper and the next NDP could incorporate these messages, highlighting the correlations between marginalization, inequality and entrenched poverty.
- Resilience is another notion helping to rally humanitarian and development actors around the common goal of addressing fragility and the needs of target populations– the RRF as well as the Drought Impact Needs Assessment have already contributed to highlight this convergence.
- Concerning durable solutions, the term “displacement affected communities” allows looking simultaneously at target populations, often referred to as “beneficiaries” by humanitarian actors, and geographical areas of interventions that are inhabited by populations in displacement and other resident groups. The practice of the cluster system in Somalia has for years highlighted the need for multi-sectoral interventions and the preference for area level approaches. Although these usually refer to IDP settlements and clusters of such settlements, partners operating on durable solutions have broadened the discussion to include all displacement affected communities and they have expanded the geographical scope of durable solutions interventions to operate at the scale of cities and towns.
- Nurturing a common understanding among humanitarian and development partners on achieving solutions is facilitated by a genuine effort and commitment in aligning the understanding of the processes necessary to achieve outcomes like voluntary integration, resettlement and return. Those processes are long-term in nature, complex and must become self-sustained over time. The Impoverishment Risk and Reconstruction Model (hereinafter IRR model) developed by Michael Cernea in the 1990s²⁸ recognizes forced relocation as a driver of impoverishment. People affected by displacement experience impoverishment through landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalization, food insecurity,

22 See One humanity: shared responsibility - Report of the Secretary-General for the World Humanitarian Summit, UN Doc. A/70/709, paras. 81 ff; World Humanitarian Summit, Transcending humanitarian-development divides - Changing People's Lives: From Delivering Aid to Ending Need, Commitment to Action, 23 May 2016, para. 3.

23 World Bank Group/DFID/UNHCR, Forum on New Approaches to Protracted Forced Displacement, Wilton Park, United Kingdom, 4-6 April 2016, Co-Hosts Summary Statement, para. 9.

24 Council of the EU, Council conclusions on the EU approach to forced displacement and development, 240/16 of 12 May 2015. See also European Commission Communication, Lives in Dignity: from Aid-Dependence to Self-Reliance. Forced Displacement and Development Brussels, 24.4.2016, COM (2016) 234 final.

25 OECD, DAC Recommendation on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus, OECD/LEGAL/5019, adopted 22 February 2019.

26 As the World Bank Vulnerability assessment shows, internally displaced persons in urban areas in Somalia are the poorest segments of the urban population.

27 Kälén and Entwistle, Breaking the Impasse (note 13), p. 59, OCHA, 2017.

28 Cernea, Michael, 'The Risks and Reconstruction Model for Resettling Displaced Populations' (1997) 15 World Development, pp. 1569 – 1588; idem, 'Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction: A Model for Population Displacement and Resettlement' in M Cernea and C McDowell (eds), Risks and Reconstruction: Experiences of Resettlers and Refugees (The World Bank 2000), pp. 11 – 55.

increased morbidity and mortality, loss of access to common property and services and social disarticulation.²⁹ Restoring the natural, physical, human and social capital can be achieved through land-based resettlement options, re-employment and housing schemes, social inclusion, restoration of community assets and services, provision of nutrition, health care and education, as well as processes of rebuilding of community networks. This model is highly compatible with the provisions of the IASC Framework on Durable Solutions³⁰ which inter alia insist that an adequate standard of living, including at a minimum access to adequate food, water, housing, health care and basic education; access to employment and livelihoods; and access to effective mechanisms that restore their housing, land and property or provide them with compensation are necessary elements to achieve durable solutions. Both approaches concentrate on the longterm nature of processes which are multidimensional and need to be supported by a different set of actors, stakeholders and institutions.

4.2 The role of the security/stabilization discourse

In Somalia efforts to establish linkages between durable solutions, peacebuilding and stabilization have extensively drawn from the literature and practice that identifies social inequalities and marginalization as root causes of conflict.³¹

Durable solutions projects that look at issues related to peacebuilding, social cohesion and human security, are premised on the assessment that displaced populations suffer from marginalization (based on identity or on the status of newcomers). They are disadvantaged in accessing social, economic, political and cultural opportunities. They depend on settlement managers that act as informal government, which aggravates their marginalization. Their situation of forced displacement becomes entrenched and protracted, and their vulnerability to shocks increases.

The theory of change of projects like Midnimo and Danwaadag posits that if the local government and institutions are capacitated to cater for the needs of populations affected by displacement, and they are perceived to be reliable interlocutors and service providers, then the sentiment of exclusion and disenfranchisement of

displaced populations will decrease while the legitimacy of the government increases and the threats to instability and insecurity will be contained and mitigated. Analyses that resonate with this type of theory of change can be found in the Dadaab Returnee Conflict Assessment published by the Danish Demining Group in August 2017, which looks at the potential conflict drivers triggered by returns in Mogadishu, Kismayo and Baidoa.³²

Beyond the specific programmes, durable solutions partners have been looking at integrated approaches with practitioners working in the security sector and stabilization, in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE), governance and protection, in the areas of peacebuilding and conflict prevention for relocation programmes that look at land allocations for sites that are close to areas not yet stabilized.³³

These approaches draw largely on the provisions of the IASC Framework on Durable Solutions that highlight the key role of local governments in displacement affected areas as well as the importance of consulting with displacement affected communities during peace and reconciliation processes.³⁴

4.3 Recommendation: Strengthening the nexus at all levels

The convergence and cooperation of international humanitarian, peace and development partners is already a reality in Somalia, but such collaboration should be increased, strategically guided and systematized.

International partners should additionally consider cooperation and technical advisory that is not limited to specific projects and their outcomes, but aimed at devising comprehensive policy options to sustain voluntary returns, local integration and resettlement. These may include a combination of infrastructure, disaster preparedness, land development, employment and social protection policies. While it is important that the durable solutions implications for these policies are discussed and dealt with by an interministerial co-ordination structure, it is equally relevant that their implementation and the response to displacement be localized and supported by a coalition of partners in the areas affected by displacement.

29 Cernea, *Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction*, pp. 20 and 22 – 30. Social disarticulation is understood as “the tearing apart of social structures, interpersonal ties, and the enveloping social fabric as a result of forced resettlement” (Christopher McDowell and Gareth Morrel, *Displacement Beyond Conflict* (Berghahn 2010, p. 165).

30 Interagency Standing Committee, *Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons* (The Brookings Institution – University of Berne Project on Internal Displacement, April 2010).

31 See, in particular Stewart, F. *Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: Understanding Group Violence in Multiethnic Societies*, 2008. Cederman, Weidmann, Gleditsch, *Horizontal Inequalities and Ethnonationalist Civil War: A Global Comparison*, in *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 105, N.3, August 2011.

32 Menkhaus, K. *Dadaab Returnee Conflict Assessment*, Danish Demining Group, 2017.

33 This is particularly true for Baidoa and Mogadishu, but it also applies to durable solutions interventions in areas like Balcad to support peacebuilding processes that attempt to deal with land dispossession and conflict driven displacement.

34 IASC, *Framework on Durable Solutions* (above note 29), pp. 8-9, 15, 24-25.

THE OPERATIONAL CHALLENGE:

BRINGING INTERVENTIONS TO SCALE

With the current numbers of households in displacement, achieving durable solutions is a long-term and complex process demanding comprehensive state and social systems to address the human insecurity and marginalization challenges many IDPs and their hosts are facing. Success requires the engagement of the international community as well as the commitment of multiple national and local stakeholders - for decades. Strategic priorities that should be set now will need to be sustainable at four levels:

- Socially, by ensuring that communities affected by displacement and the general public embrace and demand increased policy attention and accountability to resolve the negative ramifications of forced displacement;
- Economically, by ensuring that investments on measures aimed at improving the living conditions of displaced persons do not uniquely rely on external aid (whether humanitarian or developmental);
- Politically and institutionally, by ensuring that decision makers and policy makers remain accountable to their social constituencies and engage in inclusive processes;
- Environmentally, by ensuring that measures taken in support of displaced populations are climate resilient and respond to adequate levels of physical safety (e.g. relocation sites are built on soil that is not prone to floods or landslides, or that water sources that service displaced populations are not contaminated).

Looking at the current operational engagement, and at the emerging good practices, three options illustrate how strategic decisions made now could support a medium to long term process of successful, peaceful, voluntary (re)integration of IDPs into mainstream society.

5.1. Option 1: Continuing with a projectized approach

The mapping of the Aid Flows (2016 to 2018) reveals that approximately US\$ 87 million were mobilized to support initiatives on durable solutions. Most of the current interventions are supported by bilateral funding (this is the case for the five EU Reinteg projects, Danwadaag funded by DfID and the Durable Solutions Programme supported by DANIDA). Some interventions, like Midnimo, and the Cross-Border Project that are implemented by UNHCR, FAO, IOM and ILO, are supported by a UN MPTF (the UN Peacebuilding Fund). Building on the good practices established by these programmes, a projectized approach should be guided by the formulation of area-level outcomes, with a view to bring together other actors working on governance, rule of law, peacebuilding and stabilization, infrastructure, as well as/ economic development. Agreement on collective outcomes can help maximise the impact that these projects have on the localities affected by displacement, and can be complemented by mechanisms that look at the financial and social sustainability of solutions.

In terms of financial sustainability, building on initiatives promoted by the UN Joint Programme on Local Governance, and by other governance initiatives which also support the district council formation (implemented by Finnish Church Aid, and Somalia Stability Fund UNDP), partners should support the creation of Local Durable Solutions Funds. Where already established, solutions funds can be part

of District/Local Development Funds or Social Development Funds. Alternately, they can be set up as funds that look specifically at durable solutions where no other facility is in place. These revolving funds can initially be financed by external contributions, which will gradually phase-out and be replenished by private contributions, local revenues and in the long term transfers of resources from the federal to the sub-national levels. Irrespective of the source of the funds, they should support service delivery and community priorities that are relevant for (re)integration. These priorities may be articulated in the form of Community Action Plans (e.g. Midnimo and Danwadaag), or they can concentrate on sectors where the severity of needs is particularly high (housing, health, physical and social infrastructure etc.). It is important that the governance of the Funds be inclusive, transparent and participatory. Displacement affected communities must feature as decision makers and share-holders, together with other contributors.

The creation of solutions funds, as well as the monitoring of collective outcomes at local level, require inclusive platforms for effective decision making. District Displacement Solutions Task Forces that include relevant actors and stakeholders (relevant federal, state and local authorities, traditional leaders, community representatives, IDPs and hosts, private sector, project partners and implementing

partners) can be set up with a view to share information, facilitate coordination and make collective decisions. These committees should be anchored in and chaired by local authorities and will be instrumental in agreeing, monitoring, and reviewing area level outcomes, or manage durable solutions funds. Such local ownership would help to increase the efficiency of fund use, strengthen impact and enhance overall accountability (both social and political).

In the projectized approach, the social accountability generated by the participation in district level fora becomes the stepping stone for financial sustainability, which can support aspects of physical, material and legal safety overtime. Achieving simultaneously sustainability at the four levels described above is unlikely, however it is possible to ensure that foundations of social and financial sustainability generate positive externalities vis a vis the political and environmental sustainability too.

5.2 Option 2: Creating an environment with strong incentives to invest in durable solutions

Attaining durable solutions deals with anchoring populations in displacement to a location of their choice. This option draws on three models developed by Dyfed Aubrey (UN Habitat) in the framework of a factfinding mission looking at urbanization and displacement.³⁵ The core concept is to look at how the physical space that receives displaced communities may be harnessed to create an incentive for broader city development. The three models consider different types of tenure systems and ownership for land allocations destined to cater for housing and service needs of communities living in informal settlements. They explore possibilities to leverage on the land value to pay for construction and services in areas where housing for displaced communities are planned. Based on tools to capture the land value, a system of incentives is designed to create a win-win situation for private sector, municipalities, urban residents and displacement affected communities.

- The first model looks at privately owned land. In a situation like Somalia, where the economy is not very diversified, land becomes a very important target for investment.³⁶ This results in speculation and land grabbing, and it is one of the reasons of the recurring evictions in the country. In these situations, private land may be vacant and not developed, or can be temporarily inhabited by “squatters” who are allowed to stay until the value increases and the landlord decides to sell. Model 1 looks at “fit for purpose” land administration systems as a means to support land sharing, so that private land occupied by informal settlers is redeveloped in a way that enables the regularization of the existing development through housing for people living on someone else’s land. In Somaliland underdeveloped private land can be taxed by the municipality up to 30%, resulting in revenues that can be used as a contribution towards public utilities. In other systems, like Puntland for example, betterment levies could

be introduced. According to this system, the state collects a tax on a land parcel the value of which has improved as a result of infrastructure investment or other actions, (e.g. roads infrastructure tends to increase the value adjacent land). It can be collected as a financial payment or, ideally, a proportion of the land where IDPs and urban poor can be settled. Land administration and sharing can generate funds for services, and transfer of ownership from private owners to municipal authorities, which would then have space to accommodate the housing needs of displaced populations living in informal settlements. Due to increased land value, such areas may also attract businesses which can provide employment and livelihood opportunities for IDPs.

- The second model looks at scenarios where the municipality has land and wants to allocate it to displaced households. In this case, external actors (or the municipality) invest first into infrastructure such as water, school buildings, health posts etc. Housing plots are then demarcated and distributed to IDPs who receive tenure documents. Plots are big enough for two housing units which allows IDPs to sell a portion of their land to finance the construction of their own house. The sold portion is re-registered under a new owner. Market stalls can also be built and handed over to local government and revenue gained invested in site improvement (e.g. road surfacing and drainage). If the site is close to areas that have commercial or agricultural potential more infrastructure could be provided by the private owners of that land, with positive returns on the employment and livelihood situation of the displaced communities living on the land. This model leverages on infrastructure investment on the land provided by the municipality and, depending on the size of the plot, allows building a larger quantity of houses compared by to an approach with the international community building housing themselves.

³⁵ This interagency mission was requested in January 2019 by the DSRSG/HC/RC in support of cross-cutting priorities on Urbanization and Displacement, and it was financially supported by the United Nations Human Settlements Programme, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the United Nations Development Programme, the International Organization for Migration and the Office of the DSRSG/HC/RC. The first leg of the mission covered Hargeisa, Garowe, Mogadishu and Baldoa and took place from 12 to 24 February. The second leg of the mission covered Bossaso and Mogadishu and took place from 09 to 14 March, in conjunction with the last mission of the Special Advisor on Internal Displacement.

³⁶ Aubrey, D. and Cardoso, L., Towards Sustainable Urban Development and IDP Durable Solutions at Scale, A report for the United Nations in Somalia, forthcoming.

- The third scenario, a variation of the second model, is based on public-private partnerships and involves developer led construction of houses for IDPs and other vulnerable groups on municipally owned land. It may be applicable to cities like Baidoa or Bossaso where a large parcel can be transformed in a city extension to cater for housing needs of the displaced communities and, depending on the situation, their hosts. The concept for the land development requires an inclusive planning process, with strong stakeholder oversight, in platforms similar to the one described above (District Durable Solutions Committees). Donor provision of trunk and social infrastructure, prior to bidding, will increase the land value. The developer will be required to submit design layouts and financial bids for the development of the site, and to commit to the provision of core housing units for IDPs, site infrastructure, public space etc. In terms of incentives, the developer can deduct the costs of building housing for IDPs from his bid and profits from the sale of other houses he is building. The IDP houses may be managed by a municipal social housing fund and be purchased by IDPs through subsidies and rent to own schemes. The fund would thus be able to replenish itself and cater for the construction of other housing units. Initially, IDPs will be given community tenure, meaning that they cannot be evicted from their houses, but also cannot sell their houses – if they decide to leave they would forfeit their right to an eligible beneficiary. Later on, IDPs will be given the right to purchase and extend their properties. Group savings and loans schemes can be set up to support this purpose. Like the second model, this approach is also likely to generate employment and livelihood opportunities for IDPs which could be supported by international actors with training and similar programs.³⁷

In all three models, the land value will effectively absorb the cost of providing IDP housing at scale and thus maximize the potential of land-based financing for IDP housing. Donor contributions are thus used to provide social amenities instead of houses and thus leverage finance for greater social impact.

These models are not without risks in a context where certain displaced communities are victims of deeply rooted discrimination and marginalization. It will therefore be important to develop (i) appropriate processes ensuring full consultation and participation of affected communities and other stakeholders; (ii) sound model agreements and institutional frameworks to avoid exploitive arrangements further marginalizing IDPs; (iii) models for effective public-private partnerships that would attract the interest of investors while safeguarding the role of local authorities; and (iv) approaches that are not limited to the provision of housing but also ensure access to basic services and livelihood opportunities. It would also be important that the new NDP explicitly provides for and encourages models such as those outlined here.

5.3 Recommendation: Combining options 1 and 2 and building on synergies

In practice these options can be harmonized and all of them rely on a strong synergy between local authorities, displacement affected communities, the private sector and other key stakeholders including customary leaders, security actors and civil society. Land value capture options can be implemented simultaneously to other key successful initiatives that are currently funded, and these can in turn invest in supporting measures such as “fit for purpose” land administration systems, or housing trust funds, or the initial investments on social and physical infrastructure that are necessary to stimulate the land value prior to harness its payoffs.

THE INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE:

ENSURING A WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT APPROACH

Like other countries, Somalia is confronted with the challenge of finding institutional arrangements that ensure effective coordination and implementation of activities aimed at finding durable solutions for IDPs.

At the federal level, several entities (Ministry of Interior, Federal Affairs and Reconciliation; the National Commission for Refugees and IDPs; Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs; and the Special Envoy on Migrants' and Children' Rights) are assuming different responsibilities for IDP issues in their respective capacities.³⁸ This has been resolved by the recent establishment of the Durable Solutions Secretariat coordinated by the Ministry of Planning, Investments and Economic Development (MOPEID). The Secretariat is currently working on the Federal Member States coordination led by the Ministry of Interior. The Cabinet Committee on Social and Human Development chaired by the Prime Minister provides political guidance through its Social Development Road Map. At the same time, a Draft National Policy on Refugee-Returnees and IDPs (NPRRI) is pending with Cabinet and is due to be passed, which provides for the establishment of an Inter-Ministerial Task Force for Refugee-Returnees & IDPs (ITRRI).

As regards the international community, the present SDRF Resilience Pillar sub-working group on Migration, Displacement and Durable Solutions provides the forum for aid coordination on the operational level between the Somali Federal Government and international donors and actors. Whereas a revised SDRF structure may not have a dedicated sub-Working Group, an equivalent structure to coordinate mutual accountability for aid effectiveness on Solutions will need to be established to ensure that durable solutions interventions are implemented in a coordinated manner that ultimately achieve impact-level results.

The following paragraphs present examples of an overview of different institutional solutions adopted by countries facing internal displacement situations, followed by an assessment of the Somali approach.

6.1 Model 1: Delegating implementation to a special ministry or entity

Only very few countries have delegated the task of addressing internal displacement to a special entity.

Thus, in Colombia, the so called Victims Unit (Unit for Comprehensive Victim Support and Reparation) has the main responsibility for return or resettlement of IDPs.³⁹ Experience shows that the Victims Unit has difficulties to convince line ministries to join efforts to achieve the goal of durable solutions.⁴⁰ This is not surprising, taking into account that delegating a task that essentially requires a whole of government approach to an isolated entity will create a perception among line ministries and other stakeholders that they have hardly any responsibility to contribute to durable solutions. Georgia used to delegate full responsibility for IDPs including durable solutions to a specific Ministry (Ministry of Internally Displaced Persons from the Occupied Territories, Accommodation and Refugees of Georgia).⁴¹ However, the government decided in 2018, to dissolve the Ministry and integrate its functions into "three existing ministries - Regional Development and Infrastructure, Internal Affairs, and Health."⁴²

While responsibility for humanitarian responses in emergency situations may best be assigned to one body in order to avoid coordination problems within the administration, these experiences indicate that due to the crosscutting nature of efforts to achieve durable solutions, delegating implementation exclusively to a special ministry or entity is highly problematic.

38 The National Commission for Refugees and IDPs (NCRI) is responsible for durable solutions as provided for by Art. 5(3) of the Establishment Law of the National Commission for Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) of 3 February 2016. In accordance with this provision, the NCRI has been assigned the task of implementing the National Action Plan for Durable Solutions of Somali Refugee-Returnees and IDPs (Office of the Prime Minister, Road Map for Social Development Sector, 2017-2020, activity 15. (Roadmap Version revised in April 2019). The Ministry of Interior is in charge of coordination at sub-national levels, including with regard to durable solution projects implemented at district or city levels. The Ministry of Planning has created a Durable Solutions Unit in November 2018. The Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs has a Durable Solutions Advisor working in the ministry since April 2018.

39 Ley No. 1448 por la cual se dictan medidas de atención, asistencia y reparación integral a las víctimas del conflicto armado interno y se dictan otras disposiciones [Colombia], 11 June 2011, Article 66.

40 See Kälén and Entwistle, Breaking the Impasse (note 13), p. 94.

41 Law of 2014 on Internally Displaced Persons – Persecuted from the Occupied Territories of Georgia, 6 February 2014, Articles 17 and 18.

42 See Georgian PM Presents Cabinet Structure Changes, No Names, 26 June 2018, <https://www.rferl.org/a/georgia-pm-presents-cabinet-structure-changes-no-names/29321218.html>. Responsibility for durable solutions now lies with the Ministry of IDPs from the Occupied Territories, Labour, Health and Social Affairs of Georgia, a solution which allows building on the synergies within the ministry. Last accessed 7 May 2019

6.2 Model 2: Combining an inter-ministerial mechanism with a lead ministry or entity

Many countries with IDPs combine an inter-ministerial mechanism with a lead ministry or entity.

In Ukraine,⁴³ for instance, the Cabinet of Ministers is coordinating and supervising activities of the ministries and other bodies which implement activities on behalf of IDPs. While the Ministry for Temporarily Occupied Territories and Internally Displaced Persons is the lead ministry and focal point, the Action Plan on Implementation of the Strategy of Integration of Internally Displaced Persons and Implementation of Long-Term Solutions on Internal Displacement for the Period till the Year 2020 (adopted November 2018) assigns tasks to different line ministries in great detail. According to a 2013 IDP policy, in Yemen a Supreme Committee for Addressing Internal Displacement is chaired by the Prime Minister and has relevant Ministries and Governors as members. An Executive Unit for IDPs is designated as national institutional focal point on internal displacement with the “leading role and responsibility for implementation.”⁴⁴ In Kenya, the Cabinet Secretary, while chairing the inter-ministerial committee in charge of displacement issues, has the authority to delegate this task to a government department.⁴⁵

Sri Lanka and Afghanistan have opted for a slightly different approach: Here, the responsibility of chairing such mechanism lies with the ministry that has the lead on displacement issues. While the Sri Lankan⁴⁶ Ministry of Prison Reforms, Rehabilitation, Resettlement and Hindu Religious Affairs also acts as a focal point, “key line ministries with mandates over areas essential to the provision of assistance, protection and durable solutions” participate in the implementation of the IDP policy. In Afghanistan,⁴⁷ the lead ministry (Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation) is mainly in charge of policy and coordination while implementation lies with relevant line ministries and other governmental entities whose roles are described in detail in the IDP Policy.⁴⁸

These arrangements combine the strength of a coordination mechanism at highest governmental levels with the advantage of having a clear focal point in the form of a lead ministry or entity. Such arrangements can work well, provided that there is a clear division of tasks among line ministries and relevant other entities and their respective roles and responsibilities are clearly defined.

6.3 Model 3: Creating a stand-alone committee structure in charge of durable solutions

Myanmar is presently considering a different solution. According to its Draft Strategy on IDP Camp Closure, a National-level Committee on Closure of IDP Camps will be created which in turn will set up Working Committees on Closure of IDP camps for relevant regions and states which are tasked with developing action plans to find durable solutions. The National Level Committee is composed of representatives of the national government, state governments and community leaders. The Working Committees have a similar composition but also include the UN and INGOs. They will have a series of thematic Sub-Committees where relevant line ministries will play key roles.

Committee solutions like this, while complex, facilitate a whole-of-government approach with clear responsibilities assigned to each of the sub-Committees. They also allow the participation of UN agencies and international or local NGOs at technical levels.

⁴³ See Law of Ukraine On ensuring of rights and freedoms of internally displaced persons (2014; amended 2015) and Ordinance of 15 Nov. 2017 N° 909 On Approval of the Strategy of Integration of Internally Displaced Persons and Implementation of Long-Term Solutions to Internal Displacement until 2020.

⁴⁴ National Policy for Addressing Internal Displacement in Republic of Yemen (2013).

⁴⁵ Kenya, The Prevention, Protection and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons and Affected Communities Act, 2012, section 11, para. 2.

⁴⁶ Ministry of Prison Reforms, Rehabilitation, Resettlement and Hindu Religious Affairs, National Policy on Durable Solutions for Conflict-Affected Displacement, 2016.

⁴⁷ The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation, National Policy on Internally Displaced Persons (2013), section 4.

⁴⁸ Annex II.

6.4 Recommendation: Determining the respective roles of federal ministries and entities

As mentioned above, Somalia has made important progress in creating an institutional structure at the federal level to deal with durable solutions that is close to model 2 and reflects Somali realities. The Cabinet Committee on Social and Human Development chaired by the Prime Minister with its Social Development Roadmap and the Durable Solutions Secretariat offer a solid framework for coordination. The role of MoPIED is framed in terms of ensuring horizontal coordination between relevant ministries as well as ensuring that solutions are adequately reflected in relevant plans and programmes, whereas NCRI has the responsibility for developing policies, strategies and datasets. At the same time, the Ministry of Interior as Secretariat member is responsible for vertical coordination between the federal and subnational levels, especially when the role of district authorities and processes leading to their establishment is concerned.

A remaining challenge is to ensure that the National Policy on Refugee-Returnees and IDPs (NPRRI) once approved does not create new parallel structures. The present draft provides for an Inter-Ministerial Task Force for Refugee-Returnees & IDPs (ITRRI) which “shall coordinate and oversee the roles and responsibilities” of the different actors dealing with IDPs and returning refugees. The present text does not specify how this body will relate to the Durable Solutions Secretariat and the Cabinet Committee on Social and Human Development. This needs to be clarified. One option would be to provide that the Durable Solutions Secretariat with support or assume the functions of ITRRI at a technical level, whereas the Cabinet Committee on Social and Human Development has to provide guidance at a political level, including in case

of disagreements regarding roles and responsibilities of relevant actors. Regarding institutionalisation of these coordination bodies, it will be critical that their function be cross-referenced in forthcoming tools and instruments including, in particular, the next edition of the National Development Plan (2020-2024).

Furthermore, it is recommended to mention that District Displacement Solutions Committees (section 5.1.1 above) may be set up at local levels for the purpose of implementing specific projects, with the caveat that where district councils have been elected, the committees should be integrated in the same administrative structure.

Finally, as provided for by Chapter 5 of the draft policy, a revised National Action Plan should detail the respective roles and responsibilities of the relevant line ministries, other federal entities and the Federal Member States in accordance with their prescribed constitutional and legal roles with regard to each of the tasks and measures listed in Chapter Three section 3.3 “Durable solutions: Conditions and support measures” of the Draft Policy. Thus, for instance, the Ministry of Public Works, Reconstruction and Housing would be responsible for issues related to the construction of houses (section 3.3, subsection 2) and the Ministry of Education for measures regarding education (section 3.3., subsection 2b)⁴⁹, etc.

Lastly, as mentioned earlier, coordination efforts should establish accountability frameworks for the achievement of impact results in support of voluntary and dignified processes of local integration, return and resettlement. In this regard it is key that a mechanism linking the Somali authorities to development partners is established (or maintained) in order to ensure a platform for accountability on aid effectiveness. This will be very important in order to ensure coherence in the implementation of the national priorities.

CONCLUSION

The Somalia Durable Solutions Initiative has made important progress, but impact on the lives of the huge number of IDPs has been limited. More than three years since the launch of the Initiative in 2016, the time has come to look into ways to scale up efforts to improve the lives of marginalized IDPs, returning Somali refugees and their hosts, and ultimately find durable solutions ending their displacement and allowing them to (re-)integrate into main-stream society. In a context of rapid urbanization where a majority of IDPs does not wish or is unlikely to return to rural areas, such solutions must be primarily based on area based urban interventions that provide IDPs and returnees with safety as well as adequate housing with security of tenure and access to basic services, and are linked to labour markets and other livelihood opportunities. Such approaches require strong local ownership and accountability. Localized multi-stakeholder coordination platforms (District Displacement Solutions Committees) and Local Durable Solutions Funds would help to meet this requirement.

To significantly scale up durable solutions programs and projects requires to further strengthen efforts enhancing the humanitarian-development-peacebuilding nexus at financing, planning and operational levels. A better understanding that despite different concepts and working methods humanitarian and development actors share many core values as well as the more frequent use of multi-partner trust funds and joint or joined-up programs would, among others, significantly contribute to strengthening this nexus.

The early adoption of the presently almost finalized Draft Somalia National Policy for Refugees, Returnees and IDPs, Draft Housing, Land and Property Act for Refugees, Returnees & IDPs, as well as Draft National Evictions Guidelines would be important to provide a solid normative framework at the federal level. It would also be important that the next National Development Plan will (i) mainstream displacement issues into relevant chapters; (ii) focus on an urbanization and poverty alleviation perspective to achieve durable solutions; (iii) link responsibilities for durable solutions to resource allocation and an accountability framework based on fiscal scenarios; (iv) and promote interventions which trigger private investments and facilitate public-private partnerships, particularly with regard to providing housing solutions for displacement affected communities while not neglecting issues linked to safety, access to basic services and livelihoods.

At the operational level, complementing on-going programs and projects to find durable solutions with models that leverage on the land value to pay for construction and services in areas where housing for displaced communities are planned (see above, section 5.2), including the creation of opportunities for public-private partnerships and win-win situations for private sector, municipalities, urban residents and displacement affected communities would be crucial to reach a critical scale of interventions.

Finally, despite important progress made at the federal level, further efforts are needed to clarify the respective roles and responsibilities of different governmental actors in order to ensure a whole-of-government approach.