



# Security Council

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## Resolution 2232 (2015)

**Adopted by the Security Council at its 7491st meeting, on  
28 July 2015**

*The Security Council,*

*Recalling* all its previous resolutions and statements of its President on the situation in Somalia,

*Underlining* its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence, and unity of Somalia,

*Condemning* recent Al Shabaab attacks in Somalia and beyond, *expressing serious concern* at the ongoing threat posed by Al Shabaab, and *underlining* its concern that Al Shabaab continues to hold territory in Somalia,

*Expressing* outrage at the loss of civilian life, in Al Shabaab attacks, and *paying tribute* to the bravery and sacrifices made by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Somali National Army (SNA) personnel in the fight against Al Shabaab, as well as to United Nations (UN) staff killed in the Garowe attack,

*Reiterating* its determination to support efforts to reduce the threat posed by Al Shabaab in Somalia, and *underlining* its commitment to support a Somali-led political peace and reconciliation process,

### AMISOM

*Welcoming* the Report of the Joint African Union – United Nations Mission on the Benchmarks for a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation in Somalia and recommendations on the next steps in the military campaign ('The Joint UN-AU Review') requested in resolution 2182 (2014), and *taking note* of the review's recommendations,

*Welcoming* the constructive manner in which the UN and African Union (AU) conducted the review,

*Welcoming* the progress of AMISOM and the SNA in the fight against Al Shabaab, in particular through Operations 'Indian Ocean' and 'Eagle', and *underlining* the importance of continuing offensive operations against Al Shabaab,



*Taking note* of the African Union Peace and Security Council's (AUPSC) 30th June 2015 communiqué, which endorsed the recommendations of Joint UN-AU Review, and *underlining* its call for full adherence to the AMISOM command and control architecture, which can help to ensure that the recommendations of the joint review are properly implemented,

*Welcoming* the support of the international community to peace and stability in Somalia, in particular the European Union for its substantial contribution in supporting AMISOM, as well as support from other key bilateral partners to both AMISOM and the SNA, and *emphasizing* the importance of new contributors, in particular the AU, sharing the financial burden of supporting AMISOM,

*Welcoming* the AU's investigation of allegations of sexual violence allegedly perpetrated by some AMISOM troops, *underlining* the importance of the AU implementing the recommendations of the report, *expressing* its disappointment that the AU did not receive full cooperation from all AMISOM troop contributing countries in carrying out its investigation, and *calling* on the AU and troop contributing countries to ensure that allegations are properly investigated and appropriate follow-up action is taken, including full investigation of those cases of abuse evidenced by the AU investigation team,

#### **UNSOM**

*Commending* the role of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) in supporting peace and reconciliation and the promotion and protection of human rights in Somalia,

*Underlining* the importance of UNSOM consolidating its presence across Somalia in order to help facilitate political dialogue between the centre and the regions and to support local peace and reconciliation processes,

*Determining* that the situation in Somalia continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

*Acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

#### **AMISOM**

1. *Agrees* with the Secretary-General that conditions in Somalia are not appropriate for the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping mission until the end of 2016 at the earliest;

2. *Welcomes* the revised benchmarks as set out in the Secretary-General's letter to the President of the Security Council of 2 July 2015, *agrees* with his conclusion that the achievement of the benchmarks could pave the way for the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation which could help consolidate the peace process in Somalia and the development of Somali security sector institutions, and *requests* the Secretary-General to keep these benchmarks under continuous review, in consultation with the AU;

3. *Decides* to authorize the Member States of the AU to maintain the deployment of AMISOM, as set out in paragraph 1 of resolution 2093 (2013) until 30 May 2016, in line with the Security Council's request to the AU for a maximum level of 22,126 uniformed personnel, and as part of an overall exit strategy for AMISOM, after which a decrease in AMISOM's force strength will be considered,

and *further decides* that AMISOM shall be authorized to take all necessary measures, in full compliance with its Member States' obligations under international humanitarian law and human rights law, and in full respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia, to carry out its mandate;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to provide a logistical support package for AMISOM, referred to in paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 of resolution 2010 (2011), paragraphs 4 and 6 of resolution 2036 (2012), paragraph 2 of resolution 2073 (2012), paragraph 4 of resolution 2093 (2013), and paragraph 26 of resolution 2182 (2014), ensuring the accountability and transparency of expenditure of UN funds as set out in paragraph 4 of resolution 1910 (2010), and consistent with the requirements of the Secretary-General's Human Rights Due Diligence Policy;

5. *Underlines* that the security strategy for the next 18 months should aim to create and preserve an enabling environment for the political, and peace and reconciliation processes to unfold in Somalia, *agrees* with the Secretary-General's assessment that the security strategy in Somalia should be guided by three objectives:

- i) Continuing offensive operations against Al Shabaab strongholds;
- ii) Enabling the political process at all levels, including through securing critical political processes throughout Somalia;
- iii) Enabling stabilisation efforts through supporting the delivery of security for the Somali people to facilitate the wider process of peacebuilding and reconciliation, including through the gradual handing over of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the SNA and subsequently to the Somali police force;

6. *Requests* that, in line with the recommendations of the Joint AU-UN Review, the AU undertakes a structured and targeted reconfiguration of AMISOM to enable a surge in its efficiency, in particular by strengthening command and control structures, enhancing cross-sector operations, examining sector boundaries, generating a dedicated special forces' capability under the authority of the Force Commander, which should operate alongside existing Somali special forces, generating all the requisite specialized units recommended by the Secretary-General's letter of 14 October 2013 and authorized in paragraph 3 of resolution 2124 (2013), ensuring that all force enablers and multipliers operate under the authority of the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission and Force Commander, and taking into account progress achieved in offensive operations against Al Shabaab and other terrorist organisations, by gradually, and in a limited manner, and where appropriate, reconfiguring AMISOM uniformed personnel in favour of police personnel within the authorized AMISOM personnel ceiling, *welcomes* in this regard the intention of the AU to develop a new Concept of Operations for AMISOM, and *requests* the AU to develop this concept in close collaboration with the UN by 30 October 2015;

7. *Welcomes* the Secretary-General's commitment to work with the AU Chairperson, troop contributing countries, and Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) to help ensure that this surge in efficiency materialises and is sustained over time, and *requests* the Secretary-General to monitor the implementation of this

surge, including through performance indicators, and in this regard to keep the Council updated in his regular reporting;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to work closely with the AU in supporting the implementation of this resolution, paying particular attention to the provisions of paragraph 6 of this resolution, *further requests* the Secretary-General to continue to provide technical and expert advice to the AU on the planning, deployment and strategic management of AMISOM through the UN office to the AU, and *reiterates* its request to the Secretary-General, in view of the need to increase AMISOM's efficiency, to enhance the provision of technical advice to the AU through existing UN mechanisms;

9. *Agrees* with the Secretary-General that a joint AMISOM – UN – Somali planning mechanism should assess and facilitate the delivery of the strategy set out in paragraph 5 of this resolution, as well as in the implementation of stabilisation priorities and, ensuring in particular thorough coordination and consultation ahead of, during and after offensive operations;

10. *Underlines* that it is essential that military operations are followed immediately by national efforts to establish or improve governance structures in recovered areas and by the delivery of basic services, including security;

11. *Underlines* the imperative of securing key supply routes to areas recovered from Al Shabaab, *requests* AMISOM and the SNA to ensure they give the utmost priority to securing key supply routes essential to improve the humanitarian situation in the most affected areas, and as a critical condition for logistical support to AMISOM, and *requests* the Secretary-General to report, in consultation with the FGS and AMISOM, on progress in this regard in his written reports to the Security Council;

12. *Agrees* with the Secretary-General that there have been gaps in the integrated provision of logistical support to AMISOM and SNA troops, and *underscores* that the delivery of logistical remains a joint responsibility between the UN and AU, and *underlines* its determination to seek improvements to the support provided to AMISOM, and provided by UNSOA to the SNA, as funded through the UN trust fund;

13. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in consultation with all stakeholders, to carry out a strategic review of UNSOA, including a thorough review of support provided to AMISOM by all partners, and set out a wide range of options on how to improve overall support to AMISOM, in the context of the efficiency surge outlined in paragraph 6, including through making improvements to the performance, management, and structures of UNSOA, bearing in mind the imperative of responsible cost control and taking into account the availability of resources, and *further requests* the Secretary-General to present these options to the Council by no later than 30 September 2015;

14. *Stresses* the critical need to source contingent owned equipment including force enablers and multipliers as provided for in paragraph 6 of resolution 2036 (2012) either from existing AMISOM Troop-Contributing Countries or other Member States, *emphasizes* in particular the need for an appropriate aviation component of up to twelve military helicopters, *welcomes* the progress made in the partial generation of this component, and *encourages* Member States to respond to AU efforts to mobilize such equipment urgently;

15. *Welcomes* the commencement of activities establishing a Civilian Casualty Tracking Analysis and Response Cell (CCTARC) as requested in resolutions 2093 (2013) and 2124 (2013), and *underlines* the importance of making the CCTARC operational and effective without further delay, in collaboration with humanitarian, human rights and protection actors, and ensuring information is shared with relevant actors including the UN;

16. *Reiterates* its call for new donors to support AMISOM through the provision of additional funding for troop stipends, equipment, technical assistance and uncaveated funding for AMISOM to the United Nations Trust Fund for AMISOM, *calls upon* the AU to consider how to provide sustainable funding for AMISOM, such as through its own assessed costs as it did for the African-led International Support Mission in Mali, and *underlines* the AU's call for its Member States to provide financial support to AMISOM;

### **Somali National Security Forces**

17. *Stresses* the importance of accelerating the strengthening and improved coordination of the Somali security institutions and to initiate efforts to move towards the eventual handover of security responsibilities to the Somali security services, including through the establishment of a forum between the FGS, AU and UN to specifically plan for, and regularly monitor, the handover of security responsibilities, which is an essential part of AMISOM's eventual exit strategy and further *calls for* the rapid completion of the Somali National Security Sector architecture, including a definition of the roles of relevant national security sector institutions as a way of improving coordination between the SNA and AMISOM;

18. *Welcomes* the adoption of the Guulwade (Victory) Plan as a critical step towards the development of the capacity of a more effective and sustainable Somali National Army, including the initial priority of supporting and developing the 10,900 SNA troops, *welcomes* the efforts taken so far by the FGS in establishing an integrated army, and *urges* the FGS to complete this process across Somalia as soon as possible, *notes* the importance for implementing the Guulwade (Victory) Plan of AMISOM's provision of training and mentoring to the SNA, and *underscores* the importance of bilateral partners delivering on any pledged support as well as supporting UNSOM in implementing its mandate to assist the FGS in coordinating international donor support on security sector assistance, and in this regard *emphasizes* the importance of UNSOM's mandate to assist the FGS in coordinating international donor support on security sector assistance;

19. *Welcomes* efforts to develop a realistic police plan linked with medium-term rule of law programmes and in line with the federal vision, taking into account existing plans for the development of the Somali National Police Force, and *emphasizes* the importance of substantially contributing to the development and sustenance of the regional police forces, while continuing police initiatives in Mogadishu, *welcomes* the FGS' initial draft 'Heegan' plan for the police and *looks forward* to its finalisation by the end of October 2015, and in this regard *takes note* of the recommendation of the Secretary-General to establish a non-lethal support package for the Somali police force, further *stresses* that an appropriate UN trust fund or voluntary funding arrangement should be used to fund such support if authorised by the Security Council, *requests* further details from the Secretary-General for implementation and delivery of such support by 30 September 2015,

and *underlines* that such support should be provided in accordance with the human rights due diligence policy on UN support to non-United Nations forces (HRDDP);

20. *Expresses* concern over the increasing activities of Al Shabaab in Puntland and the security implications of the situation in Yemen for Somalia, *takes note* of the recommendation of the Secretary-General to extend the SNA non-lethal support package authorized in paragraph 14 of resolution 2124 (2013) to 3,000 Puntland forces on an exceptional basis upon completion of their integration process and inclusion into the Guulwade (Victory) Plan, *recalls* the criteria established in paragraph 14 of resolution 2124 (2014) with respect to the provision of non-lethal logistical support to the SNA, *recalls* UNSOA's mandate, and *underlines* its current areas of operations and limitations to its capacity, *requests* the Secretary-General to explore the feasibility of implementing this recommendation, and to report to the Council by no later than 30 September 2015;

### **UNSOM**

21. *Decides* to extend UNSOM's mandate, as set out in paragraph 1 of resolution 2158 (2014) until 30 March 2016;

22. *Underscores* the importance of UNSOM's support to the political process, in particular supporting the preparation of an inclusive, realistic and legitimate electoral process in 2016;

23. *Welcomes* the strong relationship between UNSOM and AMISOM, *welcomes* in particular the key role played by the UN Special Representative and the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission in ensuring the organisations work closely together, and *underlines* the importance of both entities strengthening further that relationship to ensure that the activities of both entities support the political process;

24. *Requests* UNSOM, subject to strict adherence to UN security requirements and in the context of the evolving security situation, to strengthen its presence in all capitals of Interim Regional Administrations to support strategically the political and peace and reconciliation process, including by engaging with the Interim Regional Administrations in support of a federal structure, taking into account operational and security constraints, and in this context *takes note* of the importance of keeping security arrangements under constant review, *encourages* regional engagement to be carried out jointly by AMISOM-UNSOM teams, *agrees* with the conclusion of the Secretary-General that deployment of civilian planning capacity in regional capitals should be a priority in order to improve joint planning between military and civilian components, and *requests* AMISOM, in accordance with its existing mandate, and Somali National Security Forces to take appropriate measures to protect UNSOM personnel, facilities, installations, equipment and mission and to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel;

### **Somalia**

25. *Welcomes* President Hassan Sheikh's and the FGS's commitment to an inclusive and credible electoral process in 2016, *underlines* the Council's expectation that there should not be an extension of electoral process timelines for either the executive or legislative branches, and *underlines* the importance of implementing this commitment including through an inclusive process to agree on

the model for the electoral process and ensuring that the National Independent Electoral Commission and Boundaries and Federation Committee are operational without further delay, and *emphasizes* the importance of reconciliation across the country as the basis of any long term approach to stability;

26. *Underlines* the need to ensure progress in the constitutional review process without further delay in order to establish an effective federal political system and a comprehensive reconciliation process that brings about national cohesion and integration, and *underlines* in this regard the importance of supporting the peaceful and inclusive completion of the state formation process and providing effective mediation when necessary and *encourages* close dialogue between the Federal Government of Somalia, regional administrations, civil society and the Somali public in this regard;

27. *Calls on* all key actors and institutions in Somalia, including Parliament, to engage constructively to ensure progress on Vision 2016 before an electoral process in 2016;

28. *Underlines* the importance of governing in a spirit of national unity in an inclusive manner, in order to ensure no further delays in the political process;

29. *Expresses* concern at continued violations and abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law in Somalia and *underscores* the need to end impunity, uphold human rights and to hold accountable those responsible for such crimes, *encourages* the FGS to finalise its Human Rights Roadmap and establish its National Human Rights Commission and to pass legislation including legislation aimed at protecting human rights and ensuring investigations and prosecutions of perpetrators of human rights violations;

30. *Expresses* concern at the increase in forced evictions of internally displaced persons from public and private infrastructure in major towns in Somalia, *stresses* that any eviction should be consistent with relevant national and international frameworks, and *calls upon* the FGS and all relevant actors to strive to provide concrete durable solutions for internal displacement;

31. *Expresses* concern at the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Somalia and its impact on the people of Somalia, *commends* the efforts of the United Nations humanitarian agencies and other humanitarian actors to deliver life-saving assistance to vulnerable populations, *condemns* any misuse or obstruction of humanitarian assistance, and *reiterates* its demand that all parties allow and facilitate full, safe and unhindered access for the timely delivery of aid to persons in need across Somalia; and *underlines* the importance of proper accounting in international humanitarian support, and *encourages* national disaster management agencies in Somalia to scale up capacity with support from the United Nations to take a stronger leadership role in coordination of humanitarian response;

32. *Underlines* the importance of respect for international humanitarian law and the protection of civilians, especially women and children, by all armed groups in Somalia;

33. *Reaffirms* the important role of women and youth in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peacebuilding, *stresses* the importance of their participation in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, *notes* that women are not adequately represented in the assemblies of the new

interim regional administrations, and *urges* the FGS and Interim Regional Administrations to continue to promote increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in Somali institutions, and *encourages* UNSOM to enhance its interaction across Somali civil society, including women, youth, and religious leaders in order to ensure that the views of civil society are incorporated in the various political processes;

34. *Welcomes* Somalia's progress towards ratifying the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) and *calls* for increased implementation of the two Action Plans signed in 2012 and strengthening of the legal framework for the protection of children, especially in light of continued abductions and recruitment of children as detailed in the Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict of 5 June 2015;

35. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council regularly informed on the implementation of this resolution, including through oral updates and no fewer than three written reports, with the first written report by 12 September, and every 120 days thereafter;

36. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

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